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Abstract
We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information
arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics
and have different information about the system over time. Because of the presence of asymmetric
information, each agent needs to form beliefs about other agents’ private information. Therefore, the
specification of the agents’ beliefs along with their strategies is necessary to study the dynamic game.
We use Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as our solution concept. A PBE consists of a pair of
strategy profile and belief system. In a PBE, every agent’s strategy should be a best response under
the belief system, and the belief system depends on agents’ strategy profile when there is signaling
among agents. Therefore, the circular dependence between strategy profile and belief system makes it
difficult to compute PBE. Using the common information among agents, we introduce a subclass of
PBE called common information based perfect Bayesian equilibria (CIB-PBE), and provide a sequential
decomposition of the dynamic game. Such decomposition leads to a backward induction algorithm to
compute CIB-PBE. We illustrate the sequential decomposition with an example of a multiple access
broadcast game. We prove the existence of CIB-PBE for a subclass of dynamic games.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Background and Motivation
Stochastic dynamic games arise in many socio-technological systems such as cyber-security
systems, electronic commerce platforms, communication networks, etc. In all these systems, there
are many strategic decision makers (agents). In dynamic games with symmetric information
all the agents share the same information and each agent makes decisions anticipating other
agents’ strategies. This class of dynamic games has been extensively studied in the literature
(see [1–5] and references therein). An appropriate solution concept for this class of games is
sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE), which consists of a strategy profile of agents that must
satisfy sequential rationality [1, 2]. The common history in dynamic games with symmetric
information can be utilized to provide a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game. The
common history (or a function of it) serves as an information state and SPE can be computed
through backward induction.
Many instances of stochastic dynamic games involve asymmetric information, that is, agents
have different information over time (such games are also called dynamic games of incomplete
information in the game and economic theory literature). In communication networks, different
nodes have access to different local observations of the network. In electronic commerce systems,
each seller has private information about the quality of his product. In cyber-security systems,
a defender can not directly detect the attacker’s activities. In this situation, if an agent wants to
assess the performance of any particular strategy, he needs to form beliefs (over time) about the
other agents’ private information that is relevant to his objective. Therefore, perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) is an appropriate solution concept for this class of games. PBE consists
of a pair of strategy profile and belief system for all agents that jointly must satisfy sequential
rationality and consistency [1, 2]. In games with asymmetric information a decomposition similar
to that of games with symmetric information is not possible in general. This is because the
evaluation of an agent’s strategy depends, in general, on the agent’s beliefs about all other
agents’ private information over time. Since private information increases with time, the space
of beliefs on the agents’ private information grows with time. As a result, sequential computation
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3of equilibria for stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information is available only for
special instances (see [6–16] and references therein).
In this paper, we consider a general model of a dynamic game with a finite number of
agents/players in a system with asymmetric information. The information available to an agent
at any time can be decomposed into common information and private information. Common
information refers to the part of an agent’s information that is known by all agents; private
information includes the part of an agent’s information that is known only by that agent. We
define a class of PBE and provide a sequential decomposition of the game through an appropriate
choice of information state using ideas from the common information approach for decentralized
decision-making, developed in [17]. The proposed equilibrium and the associated decomposition
resemble Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), defined in [18] for dynamic games with symmetric
information.
Games with asymmetric information have been investigated in the economic literature within
the context of repeated games of incomplete information (see [6–9] and references therein).
A key feature of these games is the absence of dynamics. The problems investigated in [10–
16] are the most closely related to our problem. The authors of [10–14] analyze zero-sum
games with asymmetric information. The authors of [15, 16] used a common information based
methodology, inspired by [17], to establish the concept of common information based Markov
perfect equilibria, and to achieve a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game that leads to
a backward induction algorithm that determines such equilibria. Our problem is different from
those investigated in [10–16] for the following reasons. It is a nonzero-sum game, thus, it is
different from the problems analyzed in [10–14]. Our approach to analyzing dynamic games with
asymmetric information is similar to that of [15, 16]; the key difference between our problem and
those in [15, 16] is in the information structure. The information structure in [15, 16] is such that
the agents’ common information based (CIB) beliefs are strategy-independent, therefore there is
no signaling effect. This naturally leads to the concept of common information based Markov
perfect equilibrium. In our problem the information structure is such that the CIB beliefs are
strategy-dependent, thus signaling is present. In such a case, the specification of a belief system
along with a strategy profile is necessary to analyze the dynamic game. Signaling is a key
phenomenon present in stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information. Since it plays a
fundamental role in the class of games we investigate in this paper, we discuss its nature and its
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4role below. The discussion will allow us to clarify the nature of our problem, after we formulate
it, and to contrast it with the existing literature, in particular [15, 16].
Signaling
In a dynamic game with asymmetric information, an agent’s private information is not ob-
served directly by other agents. Nevertheless, when an agent’s strategy depends on his private
information, part of this private information may be revealed/transmitted through his actions. We
call such a strategy a private strategy. When the revealed information from an agent’s private
strategy is “relevant” to other agents, the other agents utilize this information to make future
decisions. This phenomenon is referred to as signaling in games [19] and in decentralized control
[20]. When signaling occurs, agents’ beliefs about the system’s private information (which is
defined to be the union of all agents’ private information) depend on the agents’ strategies (see
[19]). Signaling may occur in games with asymmetric information depending on the system
dynamics, the agents’ utilities and the information structure of the game. Below we identify
game environments where signaling occurs, as well as environments where signaling does not
occur.
To identify game environments where signaling occurs we need to precisely define what we
mean by the statement: an agent’s private information is “relevant” to other agents. For that
matter we define the concepts of payoff relevant and payoff irrelevant information.
We call a variable (e.g. the system state, an observation, or an action) payoff relevant (respec-
tively, payoff irrelevant) to an agent at time t if the agent’s expected continuation utility at t
directly depends on (respectively, does not depend on) this variable given any fixed realization
of all other variables1. For instance, in a dynamic game with Markov dynamics where agents’
utilities at each time only depend on the current states, the current states are payoff relevant and
the history of previous states is payoff irrelevant.
There are four types of game environments depending on the payoff revelance of an agent’s
private information.
1Decomposition of agents’ types to payoff-relevant type and payoff-irrelevant type is a standard decomposition in the economic
literature. Here, we use term ’variable’ instead of ’type’ to match with the existing literature in control theory. For a more rigorous
definition consult with [21, ch.9].
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5(a) Agent n’s private information at t is payoff relevant to him at t and from t + 1 on, but
payoff irrelevant to other agents from t+ 1 on. In this game environment, agent n may use
a private strategy at t because his private information is payoff relevant to him at t. Then,
other agents can infer part of agent n’s privation information at t based on agent n’s action.
Although this revealed private information is payoff irrelevant to other agents, they can use
it to anticipate agent n’s future actions since this information is payoff relevant to agent n’s
future utility. In this game environment, signaling from agent n to other agents occurs.
(b) Agent n’s private information at t is payoff irrelevant to him at t, and is payoff relevant to
other agents from t + 1 on. This class of games includes the classic cheap-talk game [22].
In this game environment, other agents form beliefs about agent n’s private information at
t because it is payoff relevant to them. By using a private strategy, agent n can affect other
agents’ beliefs about his private information, hence, affect other agents’ future decisions.
Signaling may occur in this situation if agent n can improve his future utility when he signals
part of his private information through his actions (e.g. perfectly informative/separating
equilibria in the cheap-talk game). There may be no signaling if by revealing part of his
private information agent n does not increase his future utility (e.g. uninformative/pooling
equilibria in the cheap-talk game).
(c) Agent n’s private information at t is payoff relevant to him at t, and payoff relevant to other
agents from t+ 1 on. This game environment has both effects discussed in the previous two
environments. As a result, we may have signaling or no signaling from agent n, depending
on whether or not he can improve his future utility by using a private strategy. Decentralized
team problems are examples where signaling occurs, because signaling strategies can help
the collaborating agents to achieve higher utilities (see [23–26] for examples of signaling
strategies in decentralized team problems). Pooling equilibria in the classic two-step signaling
game [19] is an example of no signaling.
(d) Agent n’s private information at t is payoff irrelevant to all agents, including himself, from
t + 1 on. In this game environment no signaling occurs. Even if agent n uses a private
strategy at t, since his private information is payoff irrelevant from t + 1 on to all agents,
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6no agent will incorporate it in their future decisions 2. The model in [15, 16] are examples
of this situation where signaling of information does not occur.
When signaling occurs in a game, all agents’ beliefs on the system’s private information
are strategy dependent. Furthermore, each agent’s choice of (private) strategy is based on the
above mentioned beliefs, as they allow him to evaluate the strategy’s performance. This circular
dependence between strategies and beliefs makes the computation of equilibria for dynamic
games a challenging problem when signaling occurs. This is not the case for games with no
signaling effects. In these games, the agents’ beliefs are strategy-independent and the circular
dependence between strategies and belief breaks. Then, one can directly determine the agents’
beliefs first, and then, compute the equilibrium strategies via backward induction [15, 16].
Contribution
The key contributions of the paper are: (1) The introduction of a subclass of PBE called
common information based perfect Bayesian equilibria (CIB-PBE) for dynamic games with
asymmetric information. A CIB-PBE consists of a pair of strategy profile and a belief system that
are sequentially rational and consistent. (2) The sequential decomposition of stochastic dynamic
games with the asymmetric information through an appropriate choice of information state. This
decomposition provides a backward induction algorithm to find CIB-PBE for dynamic games
where signaling occurs. The decomposition and the algorithm are illustrated by an example
from multiple access communication. (3) The existence of CIB-PBE for a subclass of stochastic
dynamic games with asymmetric information.
2If one of the agents incorporates the belief on this private information in his strategy from t+1 on, all other agents may also
incorporate it. The argument is similar to situation (b) since all other agents will anticipate about how this agent will act. We
note that, agents can use such payoff irrelevant information as a coordination instrument, and therefore, expand their strategy
space thereby resulting in additional equilibria. As an example, consider a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with imperfect
public monitoring of actions [9, ch. 7]. The agents can form a punishment mechanism that results in new equilibria in addition
to the repetition of the stage-game equilibrium. In general, the idea of such a punishment mechanism is used to proof different
versions of folk theorem for different setups [9]. However, we do not call this kind of cases signaling because the signals or
actions of an agent serves only as a coordination instrument instead of transmitting private information form one agent to other
agents.
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7Organization
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model of dynamic games in Section II.
In Section III, we define the solution concept for our model and compare it with that for the
standard extensive game form. In Section IV, we introduce the concept of CIB-PBE and provide
a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game. In Section V, we provide an example of a
multiple access broadcast game that illustrates the results of Section IV. We prove the existence
of CIB-PBE for a subclass of dynamic games in Section VI. We conclude in Section VII. The
proofs of all of our technical results appear in the Appendices A-B.
Notation
Random variables are denoted by upper case letters, their realization by the corresponding
lower case letter. In general, subscripts are used as time index while superscripts are used
to index agents. For time indices t1 ≤ t2, Xt1:t2 (resp. ft1:t2(·)) is the short hand notation
for the variables (Xt1 , Xt1+1, ..., Xt2) (resp. functions (ft1(·), . . . , ft2(·))). When we consider
the variables (resp. functions) for all time, we drop the subscript and use X to denote X1:T
(resp. f(·) to denote f1:T (·)). For variables X1t , . . . , XNt (resp. functions f 1t (·), . . . , fNt (·)), we
use Xt := (X1t , . . . , X
N
t ) (resp. ft(·) := (f 1t (·), . . . , fNt (·))) to denote the vector of the set of
variables (resp. functions) at t, and X−nt := (X1t , . . . , X
n−1
t , X
n+1
t , . . . , X
N
t ) (resp. f
−n
t (·) :=
(f 1t (·), . . . , fn−1t (·), fn+1t (·), . . . , fNt (·))) to denote all the variables (resp. functions) at t except
that of the agent indexed by n. P(·) and E(·) denote the probability and expectation of an event
and a random variable, respectively. For a set X , ∆(X ) denotes the set of all beliefs/distributions
on X . For random variables X, Y with realizations x, y, P(x|y) := P(X = x|Y = y) and
E(X|y) := E(X|Y = y). For a strategy g and a belief (probability distribution) pi, we use Pgpi(·)
(resp. Egpi(·)) to indicate that the probability (resp. expectation) depends on the choice of g and
pi. We use 1{x}(y) to denote the indicator that X = x is in the event {Y = y}.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a dynamic game among N strategic agents, indexed by N := {1, 2, . . . , N}, in a
system over time horizon T := {1, 2, · · · , T}. Each agent n ∈ N is affiliated with a subsystem
n. At every time t ∈ T , the state of the system (Ct, Xt) has two components: Ct ∈ Ct denotes
the public state, and Xt := (X1t , X
2
t , . . . , X
N
t ) ∈ Xt := X 1t ×X 2t × · · ·×XNt , where Xnt denotes
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8the local state of subsystem n, n ∈ N . The public state Ct is commonly observed by every
agent, and the local state Xnt is privately observed by agent n, n ∈ N .
At time t, each agent n simultaneously selects an action Ant ∈ Ant . Given the control actions
At := (A
1
t , A
2
t , . . . , A
N
t ), the public state and local states evolve as
Ct+1 = f
c
t (Ct, At,W
C
t ), (1)
Xnt+1 = f
n
t (X
n
t , At,W
n,X
t ), n ∈ N , (2)
where random variables WCt and W
n,X
t capture the randomness in the evolution of the system,
and C1, X11 , X
2
1 , . . . , X
N
1 are primitive random variables.
At the end of time t, after the actions are taken, each agent n ∈ N observes Yt := (Y 1t , Y 2t , . . . , Y Nt ),
where
Y nt = h
n
t (X
n
t , At,W
n,Y
t ) ∈ Ynt , (3)
and W n,Yt denotes the observation noise. From the system dynamics (2) and the observations
model (3), we define, for any n ∈ N , t ∈ T , the probabilities pnt (xnt+1;xnt , at) and qnt (ynt ;xnt , at)
such that for all xnt+1, x
n
t ∈ X nt , ynt ∈ Ynt and at ∈ At := A1t × · · · × ANt
pnt (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at) := P(fnt (xnt , at,W
n,X
t ) = x
n
t+1), (4)
qnt (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at) := P(hnt (xnt , at,W
n,Y
t ) = y
n
t ). (5)
We assume that Ct,X nt ,Ant and Ynt are finite sets for all n ∈ N , for all t ∈ T .3 We also
assume that the primitive random variables {C1, Xn1 ,WCt ,W n,Xt ,W n,Yt , t ∈ T , n ∈ N} are
mutually independent.
The actions At and the observations Yt := (Y 1t , Y
2
t , . . . , Y
N
t ) are commonly observed by every
agent. Therefore, at time t, all agents have access to the common history Hct defined to be
Hct := {C1:t, A1:t−1, Y1:t−1}. (6)
Including private information, the history Hnt of agent n’s information, n ∈ N , at t is given
by
Hnt := {Xn1:t, Hct } = {Xn1:t, C1:t, A1:t−1, Y1:t−1}. (7)
3The results developed in Section II-IV for finite Ct,Xnt ,Ant and Ynt still hold when they are continuous sets under some
technical assumptions. The results of Section VI require Ant to be finite for all n ∈ N , t ∈ T .
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9Let Hct denote the set of all possible common histories at time t ∈ T , and Hnt denote the set
of all possible information histories for agent n ∈ N at time t ∈ T .
Define Ht := ∪n∈NHnt = {X1:t, Hct } to be the history of states and observations of the whole
system up to time t. The hirtory Ht captures the system evolution up to time t.
A behavioral strategy of agent n, n ∈ N , is defined as a map gnt : Hnt 7→ ∆(Ant ) where
Pgnt (Ant = ant |hnt ) := gnt (hnt )(ant ) for all ant ∈ Ant . (8)
Let Gnt denote the set of all possible behavioral strategies 4 gnt of user n ∈ N at time t ∈ T .
At each time t ∈ T , agent n, n ∈ N , has a utility
Unt = φ
n
t (Ct, Xt, At) (9)
that depends on the state of the system at t, including the public state and all local states, and
the actions taken at t by all agents.
Let g = (g1, g2, . . . , gN) denote the strategy profile of all agents, where gn = (gn1 , g
n
2 , . . . , g
n
T ).
Then, the total expected utility of agent n is given by
Un(g) = Eg
[
T∑
t=1
Unt
]
= Eg
[
T∑
t=1
φnt (Ct, Xt, At)
]
. (10)
Each agent wishes to maximize his total expected utility.
The problem defined above is a stochastic dynamic game with asymmetric information.
As discussed above, signaling may occur in games of asymmetric information. The game
instances that can be captured by our model could belong to any of the four game environments
(a)-(d) described in Section I.
III. SOLUTION CONCEPT
For non-cooperative static games with complete information (resp. incomplete information),
one can use Nash equilibrium (resp. Bayesian Nash equilibrium) as a solution concept. A
strategy profile g= (g1, · · · , gN) is a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium, if there in no agent n that
can unilaterally deviate to another strategy g′n and get a higher expected utility. One can use
(Bayesian) Nash equilibrium to analyze dynamic stochastic games. However, the (Bayesian)
4The results developed in this paper also holds when agent n’s set of admissible actions depends on his current private state.
That is, Ant ∈ Ant (xnt ) ⊆ Ant and gnt (hnt ) ∈ ∆(Ant (xnt )) when hnt = (xn1:t, hct).
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Nash equilibrium solution concept ignores the dynamic nature of the system and only requires
optimality with respect to any unilateral deviation from the equilibrium g at the beginning of
the game (time 1). Requiring optimality only against unilateral deviation at time 1 could lead to
irrational situations such as non-credible threats [1, 2]. In dynamic games, a desirable equilibrium
g should guarantee that there is no profitable unilateral deviation for any agent at any stage of
the game. That is, for any t ∈ T , for any realization ht ∈ Ht of the system evolution, the
strategy gt:T = (g1t:T , g
2
t:T · · · , gNt:T ) must be a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium of the continuation
game that follows ht. This requirement is called sequential rationality [1, 2].
In this paper we study dynamic stochastic games of incomplete asymmetric information. At
time t, the system evolution Ht is not completely known to all agents; each agent n ∈ N only
observes Hnt and has to form a belief about the complete system evolution Ht up to time t. The
belief that agent n forms about Ht depends in general on both Hnt and g
−n
1:t . Knowing the strategy
of the other agents, agent n can make inference about other agents’ private information X−n1:t
from observing their actions. As pointed out in Section I, this phenomenon is called signaling
in games with asymmetric information. Signaling results in agents’ beliefs that depend on the
strategy profile g (see the discussion in Section I). Therefore, at an equilibrium such beliefs must
be consistent with the equilibrium strategies via Bayes’ rule. Moreover, the sequential rationality
requirement must be satisfied with respect to the agents’ beliefs. We call the collection of all
agents’ beliefs at all times a belief system. A pair of strategy profile and belief system that are
mutually sequentially rational and consistent form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). We
use PBE as the solution concept in this paper to study the dynamic game defined in Sectin II.
We note that the system model we use in this paper is different from the standard model
of extensive game form used in the game theory literatures [1, 2]. Specifically, the model of
Section II is a state space model (that describes the stochastic dynamics of the system), while the
extensive game form is based on the intrinsic model [27] whose components are nature’s moves
and users’ actions. The two models are equivalent within the context of sequential dynamic
teams [28]. In order to analyze the dynamic game of the state space model of Section II, we
need to provide the formal definition of PBE for our model in the following.
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A. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
To provide a formal definition of PBE for our state space model defined in Section II, we
first define histories of states, beliefs and signaling-free beliefs on histories of states.
Definition 1 (History of States). The history of states at each time t is defined to be X1:t.
Note that the history of states contains the trajectory of local state Xn1:t that is private infor-
mation of agent n, n ∈ N .
Definition 2 (Belief System). Let µnt : Hnt 7→ ∆(X1:t). For every history hnt ∈ Hnt , the map
µnt defines a belief for agent n ∈ N at time t ∈ T which is a probability distribution on the
histories of states X1:t. The collection of maps µ := {µnt , n ∈ N , t ∈ T } is called a belief system
on histories of states.
That is, given a belief system µ, agent n ∈ N assigns the probability distribution µnt (hnt ) on
X1:t conditioning on the realized history of observations hnt ∈ Hnt at t ∈ T , by
Pµ(x1:t|hnt ) := µnt (hnt )(x1:t). (11)
Then, given the beliefs µnt (h
n
t ) for agent n ∈ N at hnt = (xn1:t, hct) ∈ Hnt and a strategy gt at
t ∈ T , when agent n takes an action ant ∈ Ant , his belief about the system following (hnt , ant ) is
given by Pgtµ (x1:t+1, yt, at|hnt , ant ) for any x1:t+1 ∈ X1:t+1, yt ∈ Yt, at ∈ At, where
Pgtµ (x1:t+1, yt, at|hnt , ant )
:=µnt (h
n
t )(x1:t)
∏
k∈N
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)q
k
t (y
k
t ;x
k
t , at)∏
k 6=n
gkt (x
k
1:t, h
c
t)(a
k
t ). (12)
Definition 3 (Signaling-Free Beliefs). The signaling-free belief system µˆ := {µˆnt : Hnt 7→
∆(X1:t), n ∈ N , t ∈ T } is defined on histories of states such that for each n ∈ N , t ∈ T ,
and hnt := (x
n
1:t, c1:t, a1:t−1, y1:t−1) ∈ Hnt
µˆnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) :=P(A1:t−1=a1:t−1)(x1:t|y1:t−1, xn1:t)
for any x1:t ∈ X1:t. (13)
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The right hand side of (13) gives the conditional probability of {X1:t = x1:t} given {Y1:t−1 =
y1:t−1, Xn1:t = x
n
1:t} when A1:t−1 = a1:t−1. This conditional probability is computed using the
realization hnt of agent n’s information, the subsystem dynamics (2), and the observation model
(3).
Note that the signaling-free belief µˆnt (h
n
t ) is strategy-independent. One can think µˆ
n
t (h
n
t ) as
the belief generated by the open-loop strategy (a1, a2, · · · , at−1), so there is no signaling and
strategy-dependent inference present in the belief system. The role of signaling-free belief will
become evident when we talk about consistency in the definition of PBE for the state space
model described in Section II.
The beliefs defined above are used by the agents to evaluate the performance of their strategies.
Sequential rationality requires that at any time instant, each agent’s strategy is his best response
under his belief about the system states.
This relation between a strategy profile g and a belief system µ is formally defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Sequential Rationality). A pair (g, µ) satisfies sequential rationality if for every
n ∈ N , gnt:T is a solution to
sup
g′nt:T∈Gnt:T
Eg
′n
t:T ,g
−n
µ
[
T∑
τ=t
φnτ (Cτ , Xτ , Aτ )|hnt
]
(14)
for every t ∈ T and every history hnt ∈ Hnt , where Eg
′n
t:T ,g
−n
µ [·|hnt ] is computed using the
probability measure generated from (11)-(12) using the belief system µ and the strategy profile
(g′nt:T , g
−n) given the realization hnt .
The above definition of sequential rationality does not place any restriction on the belief
system. However, rational agents should form their beliefs based on the strategies used by other
agents. This consistency requirement is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Consistency). A pair (g, µ) satisfies consistency if µ can be computed by Bayes’
rule whenever possible. That is, for n ∈ N , t ∈ T , such that Pgtµ (yt, at|hnt , ant ) > 0,
µnt+1(h
n
t+1)(x1:t+1) =1{xnt+1}(h
n
t+1)
Pgtµ (x1:t+1, yt, at|hnt , ant )
Pgtµ (xnt+1, yt, at|hnt , ant )
for any x1:t+1 ∈ X1:t+1 (15)
October 26, 2015 DRAFT
13
where Pgtµ (·|hnt , ant ) is the probability measure given by (12). Furthermore, when Pgµ(yt, at|hnt , ant ) =
0, µnt+1(h
n
t+1) is a probability distribution in ∆(X1:t+1) such that
µnt+1(h
n
t+1)(x1:t+1) = 0 if µˆ
n
t+1(h
n
t+1)(x1:t+1) = 0. (16)
Note that the signaling-free belief system µˆ is used in (16) of the definition for consistency. We
will explain in the discussion below the importance of signaling-free beliefs on agents’ rational
behavior.
Using the above definitions, we define PBE for the stochastic dynamic game with asymmetric
information described by the model of Section II.
Definition 6 (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium). A pair (g, µ) is called a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium (PBE) if it satisfies sequential rationality and consistency.
B. Discussion
As we mentioned earlier, the state space model and the extensive game form are different
but equivalent representations of sequential dynamic teams. We discuss the connection between
these two models for dynamic games. The table below summarizes the key components of our
state space model and the extensive game form (see [1, 2]).
State Space Model Extensive Game Form
State Xt No State
History Ht History of Actions
History Hnt Information Sets
Belief µnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) Belief on an Information Set
Support of µˆnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) Nodes in an Information Set
PBE PBE
The state variable Xt in the state space model allows us to easily describe the system dynamics
by (2). Without an explicit state variable in the extensive form, it may be complex to describe
and analyze the system dynamics. In the state space model, the system’s evolution is captured
by the history of states and observations Ht. This is the analogue of the history of (agents’ and
nature’s) actions in the extensive game form that captures the game’s evolution trajectory. The
history of information Hnt defined in the state space model includes all information available
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to agent n at time t. This history determines what agent n knows about the system, and is
the analogue of an information set in the extensive game form. Similarly, agent n’s belief on
histories of states (conditional on Hnt ) in the state space model is the analogue of agent n’s
belief over an information set in the extensive game form.
Generally, a belief µnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) can have a fixed support that includes the entire state space
X1:t. However, a belief on an information set has a variable support that includes nodes in that
particular information set. Given a strategy profile, one can determine the belief using the Bayes’
rule, given by (15), whenever possible for our state space model and (similarly) for the extensive
game form model. However, when the denominator is zero in (15), or we reach an information
set of measure zero in the extensive game form, one needs to assign values for the belief on X1:t
and on the nodes of the information set. In the extensive game form, the consistency condition
allows for any arbitrary probability distribution over the nodes of the (reached) information set of
measure zero. However, in our state space model we need to make sure that the belief assigned
is consistent with the dynamics of the system. As a result, the belief does not necessarily assign
a positive probability to a history of states and must be more carefully defined. This is where
signaling-free beliefs play an important role.
To establish the equivalence between the belief µnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) in our state space model and
the belief on the information set of the corresponding extensive game form, we introduce
the signaling-free beliefs. The signaling-free belief µnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) defined by (13) for h
n
t =
(xn1:t, c1:t, a1:t−1, y1:t−1) is constructed by actions A1:t−1 = a1:t−1 conditioned on the history
of observations y1:t−1, xn1:t using the system dynamics. In forming a signaling-free belief no
underlying strategy profile is assumed, and we do not make any further inference by tracing
back how the observed actions are generated (i.e. the observed actions are generated by an
open loop strategy). Therefore, if a history of states x1:t does not belong to the support of the
signaling-free belief (i.e. µˆnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) = 0), this history of states x1:t can not happen under any
possible strategy profile. A rational agent should not assign positive probability on any history
of states that is outside the support of the signaling-free belief. This leads to the second part of
the consistency requirement (16). With this additional requirement, the definition of consistency
in our state space model is the analogue of the consistency in the extensive game form, and the
definitions of PBE in the two models become identical.
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We note that the signaling-free beliefs are strategy-independent. In systems where any agent’s
belief on system’s states is strategy-independent (e.g. the finite games considered in [15] and
linear-Gaussian systems [16]), one can show that for any strategy profile g, the only consistent
belief system is the signaling-free belief system µˆ. In this type of systems, consistency is trivially
satisfied using the signaling-free belief system µˆ. As a result, it is sufficient to verify sequentially
rationality to establish a PBE for systems with strategy-independent beliefs.
IV. COMMON INFORMATION BASED PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIA AND SEQUENTIAL
DECOMPOSITION
In this section, we introduce the common information based (CIB) belief system and CIB
beliefs. The CIB beliefs generally depend on the agents’ strategies because of the presence of
signaling in dynamic games with asymmetric information. We use CIB beliefs to construct CIB
strategy profiles for the agents. Using the concept of CIB belief system and CIB strategy profile,
we define a subclass of PBE called common information based perfect Bayesian equilibria (CIB-
PBE). The main result of this section provides a sequential decomposition for the dynamic game
model in Section II; this decomposition leads to a backward induction algorithm to compute
CIB-PBE.
A. Preliminaries
Based on common histories, we first define CIB signaling-free belief system
Definition 7 (CIB Signaling-Free Belief System). The CIB signaling-free belief system is γˆ :=
{γˆt : Hct 7→ ∆(Xt), t ∈ T } where for each t ∈ T and hct = (c1:t, a1:t−1, y1:t−1) ∈ Hct , γˆt(hct) is a
belief on states Xt, with
γˆt(h
c
t)(xt) :=P{A1:t−1=a1:t−1}(xt|y1:t−1) for xt ∈ Xt. (17)
The right hand side of (17) is interpreted in the same way as the right hand side of (13). Note
that, γˆt(hct)(x
−n
t ) = µˆ
n
t (h
n
t )(x
−n
t ) from its definition, when hnt = (x
n
1:t, h
c
t) for any n ∈ N . We
use
Πˆt := γˆt(H
c
t ) (18)
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to denote the CIB signaling-free belief at time t. Similar to signaling-free beliefs on histories
of states defined in (13), the CIB signaling-free belief Πˆt depends only on the system dynamics
and the observation model.
The CIB signaling-free beliefs have the following dynamics.
Lemma 1 (Evolution of CIB Signaling-Free Beliefs). The CIB signaling-free beliefs {Πˆt, t ∈ T }
can be updated by
Πˆt+1 =
N∏
n=1
Πˆnt+1, where (19)
Πˆnt+1 = ψˆ
n
t (Y
n
t , At, Πˆ
n
t ), (20)
ψˆnt (y
n
t , at, pˆi
n
t )(x
n
t+1)
:=
∑
xnt ∈Xnt p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
n
t )∑
x′nt ∈Xnt q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
′n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
′n
t )
. (21)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Similar to the belief system defined in Section II, we need a belief system to form an
equilibrium. We define CIB belief systems based on the agents’ common histories together
with CIB update rules.
Definition 8 (CIB Belief System and CIB Update Rule). A collection of maps γ := {γt :
Hct 7→ ∆(Xt), t ∈ T } is called a CIB belief system. A set of belief update functions ψ = {ψnt :
Ynt ×At × Ct ×∆(Xt)×∆(Xt) 7→ ∆(X nt ), n ∈ N , t ∈ T } is called a CIB update rule.
From any CIB update rule ψ, we can construct a CIB belief system γψ by the following
inductive construction:
1) γψ,1(hc1)(x1) := P(x1) =
∏
n∈N P(xn1 ) ∀x1 ∈ X1.
2) At time t+ 1, after γψ,t(hct) is defined, set
γψ,t+1(h
c
t+1)(x
n
t+1)
:=ψnt (y
n
t , at, ct, γψ,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t))(x
n
t+1), (22)
γψ,t+1(h
c
t+1)(xt+1) :=
N∏
n=1
γψ,t+1(h
c
t+1)(x
n
t+1), (23)
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for every history hct+1 = (h
c
t , ct+1, at, yt) ∈ Hct+1 and for all xt+1 ∈ Xt+1.
For a CIB belief system γψ, we use Π
γψ
t to denote the belief, under γψ, on Xt conditional on
Hct ; that is,
Π
γψ
t := γψ,t(H
c
t ) ∈ ∆(Xt). (24)
We also define the marginal beliefs on Xnt at time t as
Π
n,γψ
t (x
n
t ) := γψ,t(H
c
t )(x
n
t ) ∀xnt ∈ X nt . (25)
Since the CIB beliefs {Πγψt , t ∈ T } are common information to all agents, all agents can
use Πγψt to evaluate the performance of their strategies. Furthermore, if a CIB update rule ψ is
properly chosen, the CIB signaling-free belief Πˆt and the CIB belief Π
γψ
t together can summarize
the agents’ common knowledge about the current system states Xt from all previous actions
A1:t−1 and observations Y1:t−1 available to all of them at time t. This motivate the concept of
CIB strategies defined below.
Definition 9 (CIB Strategy Profile). We call a set of functions λ = {λnt : X nt × Ct × ∆(Xt) ×
∆(Xt) 7→ ∆(Ant ), n ∈ N , t ∈ T } a CIB strategy profile.
For notational simplicity, let Bt := Ct ×∆(Xt)×∆(Xt) and
bt = (ct, pit, pˆit) ∈ Bt (26)
denote the realization of the part of common information used in a CIB strategy.
If agent n uses a CIB strategy λnt , then any action a
n
t ∈ Ant is taken by agent n at time t with
probability λnt (x
n
t , bt)(a
n
t ) when X
n
t = x
n
t ∈ X nt (Ct,Πγψt , Πˆγψt ) = bt ∈ Bt. Note that the domain
X nt × Bt of a CIB strategy λnt is different from the domain Hnt of a behavioral strategy gnt .
However, given a CIB strategy profile λ and a CIB update rule ψ, we can construct a behavioral
strategy profile g ∈ G by
gnt (h
n
t ) := λ
n
t (x
n
t , ct, γψ,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t)). (27)
In the following we provide a definition of a CIB belief system consistent with a CIB strategy
profile.
October 26, 2015 DRAFT
18
Definition 10 (Consistency). For a given CIB strategy λnt of user n ∈ N at t ∈ T , we call a
belief update function ψnt consistent with λ
n
t if (28) below is satisfied when the denominator of
(28) is non-zero;
ψnt (y
n
t , at, bt)(x
n
t+1)
=
∑
xnt ∈Xnt p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)η
n
t (x
n
t , y
n
t , at, bt)pi
n
t (x
n
t )∑
x′nt ∈Xnt η
n
t (x
′n
t , y
n
t , at, bt)pi
n
t (x
′n
t )
, (28)
where
ηnt (x
n
t , y
n
t , at, bt) :=q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at)λ
n
t (x
n
t , bt)(a
n
t ). (29)
When the denominator of (28) is zero,
ψnt (bt, at, y
n
t )(x
n
t+1) = 0 if ψˆ
n
t (pˆit, at, y
n
t )(x
n
t+1) = 0. (30)
For any t ∈ T , if ψnt is consistent with λnt for all n ∈ N , we call ψt consistent with λt. If ψt is
consistent with λt for all t ∈ T , we call the CIB update rule ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψT ) consistent with
the CIB strategy profile λ = (λ1, . . . , λT ).
Remark 1. Note that when the denominator of (28) is zero, ψnt (bt, at, ynt ) can be arbitrarily
defined as a probability distribution in ∆(Xt+1) satisfying (30) and consistency still holds. One
simple choice is to set ψnt (y
n
t , at, bt) = ψˆ
n
t (y
n
t , at, pˆit) when the denominator of (28) is zero; this
choice trivially satisfies (30). Thus, for any CIB strategy profile λ, there always exists at least a
CIB update rule that is consistent with λ.
The following lemma establishes the relation between the consistency conditions given by
Definition 5 and 10.
Lemma 2. If λ is a CIB strategy profile along with its consistent CIB update rule ψ, there
exists a pair, denoted by (g, µ) = f(λ, ψ), such that g is the strategy profile constructed by (27)
from (λ, ψ), and µ is a belief system consistent with the strategy profile g. Furthermore, for all
hnt ∈ Hnt , x1:t ∈ X1:t
µnt (h
n
t )(x1:t) = 1{xn1:t}(h
n
t )
∏
k 6=n
µct(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t) (31)
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where µct : Hct 7→ ∆(X1:t) satisfies the relation
µct(h
c
t)(x
k
t ) =
∑
x−k1:t ∈X−k1:t ,xk1:t−1∈Xk1:t−1
µct(h
c
t)(x1:t) = γψ,t(h
c
t)(x
k
t ) (32)
for all hct ∈ Hct , k ∈ N and xkt ∈ X kt .
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 2 implies that using a CIB strategy profile λ along with its consistent update rule ψ
we can construct a behavioral strategy profile g along with its consistent belief system µ.
Note that, equation (31) in Lemma 2 implies that for any agent n, his local states Xn1:t are
independent of X−n1:t under µ conditional on any history h
n
t ∈ Hnt . Furthermore, the conditional
independence described by (31) still holds even when agent n uses another strategy since the
right hand side of (31) depends only on the CIB update rule ψ. This fact is made precise in the
following lemma.
Lemma 3 (Conditional Independence). Suppose λ is a CIB strategy profile and ψ is a CIB
update rule consistent with λ. Let (g, µ) = f(λ, ψ). If every agent k 6= n uses the strategy gk
along with the belief system µ, then under any policy g′n of agent n, agent n’s belief about the
states X1:t for hnt ∈ Hnt is given by
Pg′n,g−n(x1:t|hnt ) = µnt (hnt )(x1:t)
=1{xn1:t}(h
n
t )
∏
k 6=n
µct(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t) for all x1:t ∈ X1:t. (33)
Proof: See Appendix A.
According to Lemma 3, for any (g, µ) = f(λ, ψ) generated from Lemma 2, we use
Pµ(x−n1:t |hct) := µnt (hnt )(x−n1:t ) = µct(hct)(x−n1:t ) (34)
to indicate that µnt (h
n
t )(x
−n
1:t ) depends only on h
c
t and µ.
B. Common Information Based Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
Based on the concept of CIB beliefs and CIB strategies, we focus on CIB-PBE defined below.
Definition 11 (CIB-PBE). A pair (λ∗, ψ∗) of a CIB strategy profile λ∗ and a CIB update rule
ψ∗ is called a Common Information Based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (CIB-PBE) if ψ∗ is
consistent with λ∗ and the pair (g∗, µ∗) = f(λ∗, ψ∗) defined in Lemma 2 forms a PBE.
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The following lemma plays a crucial role in establishing the main results of this paper.
Lemma 4 (Closeness of CIB Strategies). Suppose λ is a CIB strategy profile and ψ is a CIB
update rule consistent with λ. If every agent k 6= n uses the CIB strategy λk along with the
belief generated by ψ, then, there exists a CIB strategy λ′n that is a best response for agent n
under the belief generated by ψ at every history hnt ∈ Hnt for all t ∈ T .
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 4 says that the set of CIB strategies is closed under the best response mapping. Since
sequential rationality (Definition 4) requires a strategy profile to be a fixed point under the best
response mapping (see (14)), Lemma 4 allows us to restrict attention to the set of CIB strategies
to find a fixed point and to search for CIB-PBE.
Below we provide a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game of Section II that enables
us to sequentially compute CIB-PBE via dynamic programming.
In order to sequentially compute CIB-PBE we define a stage game for each time t ∈ T as
follows.
Definition 12. (Stage Game Gt) Given a set of functions Vt+1 = {V nt+1 : X nt ×Bt 7→ R, n ∈ N}
and a belief update function ψt, for any realization bt = (ct, pit, pˆit) ∈ Bt we define the following
Bayesian game Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt).
Stage Game Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt)
• There are N players indexed by N .
• Each player n ∈ N observes private information Xnt ∈ X nt ; bt = (ct, pit, pˆit) are common
information.
• Xt = (X1t , . . . , X
N
t ) has a prior distribution pit.
• Each player n ∈ N selects an action Ant ∈ Ant .
• Each player n ∈ N has utility
UnGt(Vt+1,ψt,bt)
:=φnt (ct, Xt, At) + V
n
t+1(X
n
t+1, Bt+1), where (35)
Bt+1 := (Ct+1, ψt(Yt, At, bt), ψˆt(Yt, At, pˆit)). (36)
If for each t ∈ T , the functions Vt+1 are associated with the agents’ future utilities, the
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Bayesian game Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt) becomes a stage game at t of the original game defined in
Section II. Therefore, we consider Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) of the game Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt).
For all Vt+1 and ψt, we define, the BNE correspondence as follows
Definition 13. (BNE Correspondence)
BNEt(Vt+1, ψt) :=
{λt : ∀bt ∈ Bt, λt|bt is a BNE of Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt),
where λnt |bt(xnt ) := λnt (xnt , bt)∀n ∈ N , xnt ∈ X nt }. (37)
If λt|bt is a BNE of Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt), then for all n ∈ N and any realization xnt ∈ X nt , any
ant ∈ Ant such that λnt |bt(xnt )(ant ) > 0 should satisfy
ant ∈ arg max
a′nt ∈Ant
{
Eλ
−n
t
pit
[
UnGt(Vt+1,ψt,bt)|xnt , a′nt
]}
. (38)
Similar to the dynamic program in stochastic control, for each time t ∈ T we define the value
update function Dnt (Vt+1, λt, ψt) for each n ∈ N .
Definition 14. (Value Update Function)
Dnt (Vt+1, λt, ψt)(x
n
t , bt) := Eλtpit
[
UnGt(Vt+1,ψt,bt)|xnt
]
. (39)
If V nt = D
n
t (Vt+1, λt, ψt), for any realization x
n
t ∈ X nt and bt ∈ Bt, the value V nt (xnt , bt)
denotes player n’s expected utility under the strategy profile λt|bt in game Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt).
Using the concept of stage games and value update functions, we provide a dynamic pro-
gramming method to sequentially compute CIB-PBE in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. (Sequential Decomposition) A pair (λ∗, ψ∗) of a CIB strategy profile λ∗ and a CIB
update rule ψ∗ is a CIB-PBE if (λ∗, ψ∗) solves the dynamic program for the value functions
V nt (·), n ∈ N , t ∈ T ∪ {T + 1} defined by (40)-(43) below.
V nT+1(·) := 0 ∀n ∈ N ; (40)
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for all t ∈ T
λ∗t ∈ BNEt(Vt+1, ψ∗t ), (41)
ψ∗t is consistent with λ
∗
t , (42)
V nt = D
n
t (Vt+1, λ
∗
t , ψ
∗
t ) ∀n ∈ N . (43)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note that, from the dynamic program, the value function V n1 (x
n
1 , (c1, pi1, pi1)) at time t = 1
gives agent n’s expected utility corresponding to the CIB-PBE (λ∗, ψ∗) conditional on his private
information Xn1 = x
n
1 and public state C1 = c1 when the prior distribution of X1 is pi1.
Using Theorem 1, we can compute CIB-PBE of the dynamic game. The following algorithm
uses backward induction to compute CIB-PBE based on Theorem 1.
Algorithm 1 Backward Induction for Computing CIB-PBE
1: VT+1 ← 0, λ∗ ← ∅, ψ∗ ← ∅
2: for t = T to 1 do
3: for every bt ∈ Bt do
4: Construct the stage game Gt(Vt+1, ψt, bt)
5: Compute (λ∗t |bt , ψ∗t |bt) such that ψ∗t |bt is consistent with λ∗t |bt , and λ∗t |bt is a BNE of
Gt(Vt+1, ψ
∗
t |bt , bt)
6: for every n ∈ N do
7: λ∗nt (x
n
t , bt)← λ∗t |bt(xnt ), xnt ∈ X nt
8: ψ∗nt (yt, at, bt)← ψ∗t |bt(yt, at), (yt, at) ∈ Yt ×At
9: V nt (x
n
t , bt)←Dnt (Vt+1, λ∗t , ψ∗t )(xnt , bt), xnt ∈ X nt
10: end for
11: end for
12: λ∗ ← (λ∗t , λ∗), ψ∗ ← (ψ∗t , ψ∗)
13: end for
Note that in line 5, for different (λ∗t |bt , ψ∗t |bt) the algorithm will produce different CIB-PBE.
Finding the pair (λ∗t |bt , ψ∗t |bt) in line 5 of Algorithm 1 requires solving a fixed point problem to
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get a BNE along with a consistent belief system. The complexity for this step is the same as
the complexity of finding a PBE for a two-stage dynamic game.
V. EXAMPLE: MULTIPLE ACCESS BROADCAST GAME
In this section, we illustrate the sequential decomposition developed in Section IV with an
example of a two-agent multiple access broadcast system.
Consider a multiple access broadcast game where two agents, indexed by N = {1, 2}, share
a common collision channel over time horizon T . At time t, W nt ∈ {0, 1} packets arrive at each
agent n ∈ N according to independent Bernoulli processes with P(W 1t = 1) = P(W 2t = 1) =
p = 0.5. Each agent can only store one packet in his local buffer/queue. Let Xnt ∈ X nt = {0, 1}
denote the queue length (number of packets) of agent n at the beginning of t. If a packet arrives
at agent n when his queue is empty, the packet is stored in agent n’s buffer; otherwise, the
packet is dropped, and agent n incurs a dropping cost of c = 2 units.
At each time t, agent n can transmit Ant ∈ Ant = {0, 1} packets through the shared channel.
If only one agent transmits, the transmission is successful and the transmitted packet is removed
from the queue. If both agents transmit simultaneously, a collision occurs and both collided
packets remain in their queues. We assume that any packet arriving at time t, t ∈ T , can be
transmitted after t. Then, the queue length processes have the following dynamics. For n = 1, 2
Xnt+1 = min
{
Xnt − Ant (1− A−nt ) +W nt , 1
}
. (44)
Assume that agents’ transmission results at t are broadcast at the end of time t. Then agent
n’s transmission decision Ant at time t is made based on his history of observation H
n
t =
(Xn1:t, A1:t−1) that consists of his local queue lengths and all previous transmissions from both
agents.
Suppose each agent gets a unit reward at t if there is a successful transmission at t. Then,
agent n’s utility at time t is the reward minus the (expected) dropping cost given by
Unt = φ
n
t (Xt, At) =
Ant⊕ A−nt − cP(Xnt− Ant (1− A−nt ) +W nt > 1|Xt, At) (45)
where x⊕ y denotes the binary XOR operator, and n ∈ N .
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The multiple access broadcast game described above is an instance of the general dynamic
model described in Section II. In the following, we use Algorithm 1 developed in Section IV to
compute a CIB-PBE of this multiple access broadcast game for two time periods, i.e. T = {1, 2}.
Before applying Algorithm 1, we note some special features of this multiple access broadcast
game. First, there is no Ct, Yt in this multiple access broadcast game. Second, since the private
state Xnt can take only values in X nt = {0, 1}, any CIB belief in ∆(X nt ) can be described by a
number pint ∈ [0, 1] for all n = 1, 2, t = 1, 2. Furthermore, given any realization bt = (pit, pˆit) ∈ Bt,
any CIB strategy λnt (x
n
t , bt), x
n
t ∈ {0, 1}, of agent n can be characterized by a number βnt ∈ [0, 1]
where
βnt := λ
n
t (1, bt)(1). (46)
This is because Ant is binary, and λ
n
t (0, bt)(1) = 0 because no packet can be transmitted from
an empty queue.
We now use Algorithm 1 to sequentially compute a CIB-PBE of the multiple access broadcast
game.
Construction of the stage game at t = 2
At t = 2, for any b2 = (pi2, pˆi2) ∈ B2, we construct the stage game G2(b2) which is a Bayesian
finite game (no need to consider a CIB update function because this is the last stage).
Computation of BNE at t = 2
Using standard techniques for static games, we obtain a BNE of G2(b2) that is characterized
by β∗2(b2) = (β
∗1
2 (b2), β
∗2
2 (b2)), and β
∗
2(b2) is given by
β∗2(b2) =

(1, 1) if pi12, pi
2
2 < c
∗,
(0, 1) if pi12 < c
∗, pi22 ≥ c∗,
(1, 0) if pi12 ≥ c∗, pi22 < c∗,
( c
∗
pi12
, c
∗
pi22
) if pi12, pi
2
2 ≥ c∗,
(47)
where c∗ := 1+cp
2+cp
. Then we obtain a CIB strategy λ∗n2 (1, b2)(1) = β
∗n
2 (b2) for n = 1, 2 at time
t = 2.
Value functions’ update at t = 2
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V n2 (x
n
2 , b2) = D
n
2 (λ
∗
2)(x
n
2 , b2), n = 1, 2, are given by
V n2 (1, b2)=

1−pi−n2 (1 + cp) if pi12, pi22 < c∗,
pi−n2 − cp if pin2 < c∗, pi−n2 ≥ c∗,
1 if pin2 ≥ c∗, pi−n2 < c∗,
c∗ − cp if pi12, pi22 ≥ c∗.
(48)
V n2 (0, b2) =

pi−n2 if pi
1
2, pi
2
2 < c
∗,
pi−n2 if pi
n
2 < c
∗, pi−n2 ≥ c∗,
0 if pin2 ≥ c∗, pi−n2 < c∗,
c∗ if pi12, pi
2
2 ≥ c∗.
(49)
Construction of the stage game at t = 1
At t = 1, for any b1 = (pi1, pˆi1) ∈ B1 and a CIB update function ψ1, we construct the stage
game G1(V2, ψ1, b1) such that each player n, n = 1, 2, has utility
UnG1(V2,ψ1,b1)
=φn1 (X1, A1) + V
n
2 (X
n
2 , (ψ1(A1, b1)), ψˆ1(A1, pˆi1))). (50)
Computation of BNE and belief update function at t = 1
When the players use CIB strategies λ1 characterized by β1 = (β1t , β
2
1), from (28) and (30), we
obtain a CIB update function ψ1, given below, that is consistent with λ1 (we select ψn1 (a1, b1)=
ψˆn1 (a1, pˆi1) when the denominator of (28) is zero).
ψn1 (at, b1) =

1 if ant = 1, a
−n
t = 1,
p if ant = 1, a
−n
t = 0,
p+pin1 (1−p−βn1 )
1−pin1 βn1 if a
n
t = 0.
(51)
Substituting (51) into (50), we have the utilities of the two players in game G1(V2, ψ1, b1). We
numerically compute a BNE of G1(V2, ψ∗1, b1), characterized by β
∗
1(b1) = (β
∗1
1 (pi1), β
∗2
1 (pi1)) such
that ψ∗1 satisfies (51) when β1 = β
∗
1 . The values of β
∗1
1 (pi1) and β
∗2
1 (pi1) are shown in Fig. 1 for
different pi1 ∈ ∆(Xt) = [0, 1]× [0, 1].
Then, we obtain a CIB strategy λ∗n1 (1, b1)(1) = β
∗n
1 (pi1) for n = 1, 2 at time t = 1.
CIB-PBE and agents’ expected utilities
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1
pi2t
β∗21 (pi1)
pi1t
Fig. 1. Strategies β∗11 (pi1) and β∗21 (pi1) in the stage game at time t = 1.
From the above computation at t = 1, 2, we obtain a CIB-PBE (λ∗, ψ∗), where λ∗ = (λ∗1, λ
∗
2)
and ψ∗ = (ψ∗1,−).
Using (50), we numerically compute the value functions V 11 (x
1
1, b1) = V
1
1 (x
1
1, pi1) = D
1
1(V2, λ
∗
1, ψ
∗
1)(x
1
1, b1)
for x1t = 0, 1, for agent 1. The results are shown in Fig. 2. These value functions give agent
1’s (conditional) expected utilities in the CIB-PBE (λ∗, ψ∗). Agent 2’s expected utilities can be
computed in a similar way.
Remark 2. The results show that agents’ beliefs depend on their strategies (see (51)). Therefore,
there is signaling in this multiple access broadcast game. Moreover, the value functions are
discontinuous in the agents’ beliefs (see (48) and (49) for time t = 2, and Fig. 2 for time t = 1).
The presence of signaling together with the discontinuity of value functions make the agents’
utilities discontinuous in their (behavioral) strategies.
VI. EXISTENCE OF COMMON INFORMATION BASED PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIA
We prove the existence of a CIB-PBE for a subclass of the dynamic games described in section
II. This subclass includes dynamic games with uncontrolled dynamics and no private values. No
private values simply means that each agent’s private information Xnt is payoff irrelevant to
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Fig. 2. Agent 1’s expected utility V n1 (xn1 , pi1) in the CIB-PBE (λ∗, ψ∗).
himself, but possibly payoff relevant to the other agents. The classic cheap-talk game [1] and
the problem considered in [29] are examples of this subclass. We conjecture that there always
exists a CIB-PBE for the general model described in Section II. We discuss this conjecture and
elaborate more on the difficulty of establishing the existence proof for the general model of
Section II at the end of this section.
To proceed formally, let Game M denote a dynamic game with uncontrolled dynamics, no
private values, finite action spaces Ant , n ∈ N , t ∈ T , and (possibly) sequential moves. Let
T := {t1, t2, · · · , tK} ⊂ T denote the set of time instants in which the system evolves according
to the following uncontrolled dynamics
Xnt+1=
Xnt if t 6= tk for all tk ∈ T ,fntk(Xntk ,W n,Xtk ) if t = tk for tk ∈ T . (52)
At tk < t ≤ tk+1 agents make decisions sequentially in tk+1−tk epochs. We assume that the order
according to which the agents take decisions is known a priori. Furthermore, agents observe the
other agents’ decisions in previous epochs; this fact is captured by including/appending previous
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actions in the common state Ct as follows
Ct+1=
(Ct, At) if t 6= tk for all tk ∈ T ,f ctk(Ctk−1+1,WCtk ) if t = tk for tk ∈ T . (53)
The agents have a common observation Ytk at each time tk ∈ T when the system evolves. The
observations Y nt , n ∈ N , t ∈ T are described by
Y nt =
 empty if t 6= tk for all tk ∈ T ,hntk(Xntk ,W n,Ytk ) if t = tk for tk ∈ T . (54)
Agent n, n ∈ N has instantaneous utility
Unt = φ
n
t (Ct, X
−n
t , At). (55)
for time t, t ∈ T . Thus, each agent n ∈ N has no private values, hence his private information
Xnt is payoff irrelevant.
From the above description, it is evident that Game M is indeed a subclass of the class of
dynamic games described by the model of Section II. The dynamic oligopoly game presented
in [29] is an instance of Game M.
The main result of this section is stated in the theorem below and asserts the existence of a
CIB-PBE in Game M.
Theorem 2. Game M described in this section has a CIB-PBE which is a solution to the dynamic
program defined by (40)-(43) in Theorem 1.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The proof of Theorem 2 is constructive. We construct an equilibrium for Game M in which
agents use non-private strategies and have signaling-free beliefs which are consistent with the
non-private strategy profile.
There are three reasons why Game M has a CIB-PBE with non-private strategies. First,
the instantaneous utility Unt = φ
n
t (Ct, X
−n
t , At) of agent n, n ∈ N does not depend on his
private information. Therefore, the agent’s best response is the same for all realizations of
his private information, and a private strategy doest not provide any advantage in terms of
higher instantaneous utility. Second, the system dynamics are strategy independent. Therefore,
an agent cannot affect the evolution of the system by using a strategy that depends on his
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private information about the state of the system. Third, any private strategy does not provide
any advantage to an agent in terms of his utility if it can not affect other agents’ decisions, and
this is the case when all agents use the signaling-free beliefs.
As we showed before, the CIB-PBE introduced in this paper are PBE. It is known that for
finite dynamic games there always exists one sequential equilibrium, and therefore one PBE
[1, 2]. The proof of existence of sequential equilibria is indirect; it is done by showing the
existence of a trembling hand equilibrium [1, 2] which is also a sequential equilibrium. The
proof of existence of trembling hand equilibrium follows the standard argument in game theory.
It uses a suitable fixed point theorem to show the existence of a trembling equilibrium in an
equivalent agent-based model representation [1, 2].
There are some technical difficulties in establishing the existence of a CIB-PBE for the general
game model considered in this paper. The standard argument in using fixed point theorems
is applicable to finite games where the expected utilities are continuous in the agent’s mixed
strategies. In each stage game arising in the sequential decomposition, say the game at stage
t, agent n’s expected utility (see (35)) depends on the functions {V nt+1, n ∈ N}. However, the
function V nt+1 is not always continuous in the strategies of agent n. (see Remark 2 for the multiple
access broadcast game in Section V and the example in [29]). Therefore, the standard argument
for establishing the existence of an equilibrium fails for our general model. Even though we
can not prove the existence of a CIB-PBE equilibrium, we conjecture that there always exists a
CIB-PBE for the general dynamic game described in this paper.
We note that for the problem formulated in Section II, {X tt , Ct,Πt, Πˆt}, t ∈ T , are sufficient
statistics from the decision making point of view (i.e. control theory). This makes a CIB strategy
a more natural strategy choice for an agent, and consequently, a CIB-PBE is a more plausible
equilibrium to arise in practice. However, this does not imply that from the game theory point
of view, at all equilibria agents’ best responses can be generated using only {X tt , Ct,Πt, Πˆt}. In
a game problem, agents can incorporate a payoff irrelevant information in their strategy choice
as a coordination instrument. For example, consider the classic repeated prisoner’s dilemma
game. In this game, agents can use previous outcomes of the game, that are payoff irrelevant, to
sustain a punishment mechanism that results in additional equilibria beyond the repetition of the
stage-game equilibrium [9]. The indirect proof for existence of sequential equilibria and PBE
(described above) allows for this type of equilibria that depend on payoff irrelevant information
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for coordination. Nevertheless, we conjecture that there always exists an equilibrium for the
game described in Section II that depends only on {X tt , Ct,Πt, Πˆt}. The example of the dynamic
multiple access broadcast game in Section V is an instance of a dynamic game that does not
belong to the subclass of Game M, but has a CIB-PBE. To make our conjecture more precise,
we provide below a sufficient condition for the existence of a CIB-PBE.
Let (g∗, µ∗) be a strategy profile that is a PBE. Consider the following condition.
Condition C: For all hct , h
′c
t ∈ Hct such that
Pµ∗(xt|hct) = Pµ∗(xt|h
′c
t ),∀xt ∈ Xt,∀n ∈ N ,∀t ∈ T , (56)
we have
gn∗t (x
n
1:t, h
c
t) = g
n∗
t (x
n
1:t, h
c′
t ), (57)
for all xn1:t ∈ X n1:t.
If Condition C is satisfied for a PBE (g∗, µ∗), then a CIB-PBE exists. We conjecture that
Condition C is satisfied for at least a PBE in the dynamic games considered in this paper.
VII. CONCLUSION
We studied a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information. We
identified game environments that can lead to signaling in dynamic games. We considered a state
space model to analyze dynamic games with private states and controlled Markovian dynamics.
We provided a comparison between our state space model and classic extensive game form
model. We showed that the two models are equivalent as long as one ensures that the belief
system associated with the state space model is compatible with the system dynamics. To ensure
the compatibility, we introduced the signaling-free belief system. Using the signaling-free belief
system, we provided a formal definition of PBE in our state space model. We used the common
information among agents to define a subset of PBE called CIB-PBE that consist of a pair of
CIB strategy profile and CIB update rule. We obtained a sequential decomposition for dynamic
games that leads to a backward induction algorithm for the computation of CIB-PBE even when
signaling occurs. We illustrated our result with an example of multiple access broadcast game.
We proved the existence of CIB-PBE for a subclass of dynamic games and provided a sufficient
condition for the existence of CIB-PBE for the general class of dynamic games considered in
this paper.
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APPENDIX A
Proof of Lemma 1: The lemma is proved by induction. Since the initial states are indepen-
dent, (19) holds at t = 1. Suppose the lemma is true at time t. Given any hct+1 = {c1:t+1, y1:t, a1:t}
at t+ 1, we have from Bayes’ rule
pˆit+1(xt+1)
=P(A1:t=a1:t)(xt+1|y1:t)
=
P(A1:t=a1:t)(xt+1, yt|y1:t−1)∑
x′t+1∈Xt+1 P(A1:t=a1:t)(x
′
t+1, yt|y1:t−1)
. (58)
The numerator in (58) can be further expressed by
P(A1:t=a1:t)(xt+1, yt|y1:t−1)
=
∑
xt∈Xt
P(A1:t=a1:t)(xt+1, yt, xt|y1:t−1)
(a)
=
∑
xt∈Xt
N∏
n=1
pnt (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
n
t )
=
N∏
n=1
∑
xnt ∈Xnt
pnt (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
n
t ). (59)
Equation (a) in (59) follows from the system dynamics, the fact At = at and the induction
hypothesis for the lemma. Substituting (59) into both the numerator and denominator of (58)
we get
pˆit+1(xt+1)
=
N∏
n=1
∑
xnt ∈Xnt p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
n
t )∑
x′nt ∈Xnt q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
′n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
′n
t )
=
N∏
n=1
ψˆnt (y
n
t , at, pˆit)(x
n
t+1). (60)
Proof of Lemma 2: If λ is a CIB strategy profile and ψ is a CIB update rule consistent
with λ, we define g ∈ G to be the strategy profile constructed by (27) from (λ, ψ).
We proceed to recursively define a belief system µ and maps {µct , t ∈ T } that satisfy (31)-
(32), and are such that µ is consistent with g. For that matter, we first define the signaling-free
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belief µˆct : Hct 7→ ∆(X1:t) given hct = {a1:t−1, y1:t−1} ∈ Hct such that for any x1:t ∈ X1:t
µˆct(h
c
t)(x1:t) := P(A1:t−1=a1:t−1)(x1:t|y1:t−1). (61)
At time t = 1 we define, for all hn1 = (x
n
1 , h
c
1) ∈ Hn1 , n ∈ N and for all x1 ∈ X1
µc1(h
c
1)(x1) :=P(x1) (62)
µn1 (h
n
1 )(x1) :=1{xn1 |hn1 }P(x
−n
1 ) (63)
Then, (31) and (32) are satisfied at time 1, and g is consistent with µ before time 1. (basis of
induction)
Suppose µct(h
c
t)(·) and µnt (hnt )(·) are defined, (31) and (32) are satisfied at time t, and g is
consistent with µ before time t (induction hypothesis).
We proceed to define µct+1(h
c
t+1)(·), and µnt+1(hnt+1)(·), and prove that (31) and (32) are satisfied
at time t+ 1, and g is consistent with µ before time t+ 1. We first define
ηkt (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t) := η
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, (ct, γψ,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t)))
=qkt (y
k
t ;x
k
t , at)λ
k
t (x
n
t , ct, γψ,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t))(a
n
t ). (64)
At time t+ 1, for any histories hct+1 and h
n
t+1, n ∈ N , we define the beliefs
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x1:t+1) :=
∏
k∈N
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1), (65)
µnt+1(h
n
t+1)(x1:t+1)
:=1{xn1:t+1}(h
n
t+1)
∏
k 6=n
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1), (66)
where for for any k ∈ N
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1)
:=
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)η
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t)∑
x′kt ∈Xkt η
k
t (x
′k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
′k
t )
(67)
when the denominator of (67) is non-zero; when the denominator of (67) is zero, µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1)
is defined by
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1)
:=

0 when µˆct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1) = 0,
γψ,t+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
t+1)
|{x′k1:t∈Xk1:t: µˆct+1(hct+1)(x′k1:t,xkt+1)6=0}|
when µˆct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1) 6= 0.
(68)
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Then (31) at t+ 1 follows directly from the above construction. We proceed to prove (32) at
t+ 1.
First consider the case when the denominator of (67) is zero. Then, for any k ∈ N , we obtain,
because of (68),
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
t+1)
=
∑
xk1:t∈Xk1:t
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1)
=
∑
xk1:t∈Xk1:t:
µˆct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1)6=0
γψ,t+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
t+1)
|{x′k1:t ∈ X k1:t : µˆct+1(hct+1)(x′k1:t, xkt+1) 6= 0}|
=γψ,t+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
t+1). (69)
When the denominator of (67) is non-zero, from (67) we get
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
t+1)
=
∑
xk1:t∈Xk1:t
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1)
=
∑
xk1:t∈Xk1:t
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)η
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t)∑
x′kt ∈Xkt η
k
t (x
′k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
′k
t )
=
∑
xkt ∈Xkt
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)η
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
k
t )∑
x′kt ∈Xkt η
k
t (x
′k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
′k
t )
(a)
=
∑
xkt ∈Xkt
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)η
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)γψ,t(h
c
t)(x
k
t )∑
x′kt ∈Xkt η
k
t (x
′k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)γψ,t(h
c
t)(x
′k
t )
=γψ,t+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
t+1), (70)
where (a) in (70) follows from the induction hypothesis for (31) at time t, and the last equality
in (70) is true because of (28) (ψ is consistent with λ).
Therefore, (32) is true at time t+ 1 from (69) and (70).
To show consistency at time t+1, we need to show that Bayes’ rule, given by (15), is satisfied
when the denominator of (15) is non-zero, and (16) holds for any histories hnt+1.
We first note that, the construction (67), (68) and the definition of signaling-free belief µˆct+1
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ensure that
µct+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1) = 0 if µˆ
c
t+1(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1) = 0. (71)
Therefore, (16) follows from (71) since the signaling-free belief satisfies
µˆnt+1(h
n
t+1)(x1:t+1)
=1{xn1:t+1}(h
n
t+1)
∏
k 6=n
µˆct(h
c
t+1)(x
k
1:t+1) (72)
which follows by an argument similar to that of Lemma 1.
Now consider (15) at t + 1 when the denominator is non-zero. From (66)-(67) the left hand
side of (15) equals to
µnt+1(h
n
t+1)(x1:t+1) = 1{xn1:t+1}(h
n
t+1)∏
k 6=n
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)η
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t)∑
x′kt ∈Xkt η
k
t (x
′k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
′k
t )
. (73)
On the other hand, the numerator of the right hand side of (15) is equal to
Pgtµ (x1:t+1, yt, at|hnt , ant )
=µnt (h
n
t )(x1:t)
∏
k∈N
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)q
k
t (y
k
t ;x
k
t , at)∏
k 6=n
λkt (x
k
t , ct, γψ,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t))(a
k
t )
=1{xn1:t}(h
n
t )
∏
k∈N
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)q
k
t (y
k
t ;x
k
t , at)∏
k 6=n
µct(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t)
∏
k 6=n
λkt (x
k
t , ct, γψ,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t))(a
k
t )
=1{xn1:t}(h
n
t )p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at)∏
k 6=n
pkt (x
k
t+1;x
k
t , at)η
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , at, h
c
t)µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t) (74)
The first equality in (74) follows from (12) and (27). The second equality in (74) follows from
the induction hypothesis for (31). The last equality in (74) follows from (64).
Substituting (74) back into both the numerator and the denominator in the right hand side of
(15), we obtain (73). Therefore, (15) is satisfied for any history hnt+1 ∈ Hnt+1 for any n ∈ N
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when the denominator of (15) is non-zero, hence, (g, µ) is consistence before time t + 1. This
completes the induction step and the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3: If agent n uses an arbitrary strategy g′n, following the same construction
(66)-(67) in Lemma 2, we can obtain a belief system µ′ from g′ := (g′n, g−n) and ψ such that
µ′nt (h
n
t )(x1:t) = 1{xn1:t}(h
n
t )
∏
k 6=n
µ′ct (h
c
t)(x
k
1:t). (75)
Since µ′ct (h
c
t)(x
k
1:t) defined by (67) and (68) depends only on the strategies g
′−n = g−n of all
agents other than n, we have for all hct ∈ Hct
µ′ct (h
c
t)(x
k
1:t) = µ
c
t(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t). (76)
Therefore, for any history Hnt ∈ Hnt
µ′nt (h
n
t )(x1:t) = 1{xn1:t}(h
n
t )
∏
k 6=n
µct(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t). (77)
The same argument for the proof of consistency in Lemma 2 shows that µ′ is consistent with
g′ = (g′n, g−n). Therefore, when Pg′n,g−n(hnt ) > 0, from Bayes’ rule we have
Pg′n,g−n(x1:t|hnt ) =Pg
′n,g−n
µ′ (x1:t|hnt ) = µ′nt (hnt )(x1:t)
=1{xn1:t}(h
n
t )
∏
k 6=n
µct(h
c
t)(x
k
1:t). (78)
Proof of Lemma 4: To simply the notation, we use Πt to denote Π
γψ
t and Bt = (Ct,Πt, Πˆt).
Let (g, µ) = f(λ, ψ) as in Lemma 2. Suppose every agent k 6= n uses the strategy gk along
with the belief system µ.
Below, we show that agent n’s best response problem (14) is a Markov Decision Process
(MDP) with state process {(Xnt , Bt), t ∈ T } and action process {Ant , t ∈ T }.
Since the strategies g−n of all other agents are fixed, when agent n selects an action ant ∈ Ant
at time t ∈ T , agent n’s expected instantaneous utility at hnt ∈ Hnt under µ is given by
Eg−nµ [φnt (Ct, Xt, At)|hnt , ant ] . (79)
Since Akt , k 6= n satisfies (27), the distribution of Akt only depends on Xkt and Bt. Therefore,
the distribution of A−nt only depends on X
−n
t and Bt. Then, for any realization x
−n
t ∈ X−nt ,
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hnt = (x
n
1:t, h
c
t) ∈ Hnt and ant ∈ Ant ,
Eg−nµ
[
φnt (Ct, Xt, At)|x−nt , ant , hnt
]
=Eg−nµ
[
φnt (ct, xt, (a
n
t , A
−n
t ))|x−nt , xn1:t, ant , hct , bt
]
=Eg
−n
t
[
φnt (ct, xt, (a
n
t , A
−n
t ))|x−nt , bt
]
=:φ¯nt (xt, a
n
t , bt, g
−n
t ); (80)
the first equality in (80) holds because given ψ, Bt = (Ct, γψ,t(Hct ), γˆt(H
c
t )) is a function of
Hct ; the second equality in (80) is true because the distribution of A
−n
t depends only on X
−n
t ,
Bt and the strategy g−nt . From (80), agent n’s instantaneous utility (79) can be written as
Eg−nµ [φnt (Ct, Xt, At)|hnt , ant ]
=Eg−nµ
[
Eg−nµ
[
φnt (Ct, Xt, At)|X−nt , ant , hnt
] |hnt , ant ]
=Eg−nµ
[
φ¯nt ((x
n
t , X
−n
t ), a
n
t , bt, g
−n
t )|hct , xn1:t, ant
]
(a)
=Eµ
[
φ¯nt ((X
−n
t , x
n
t ), a
n
t , bt, g
−n
t )|hct
]
(b)
=Epit
[
φ¯nt ((X
−n
t , x
n
t ), a
n
t , bt, g
−n
t )
]
=:φ˜nt (x
n
t , bt, a
n
t , g
−n
t ). (81)
Equation (a) is true because, from Lemma 3, X−nt and Xnt are independent conditional on h
c
t .
Equation (b) follows from the fact that pit is the distribution of Xt conditional on hct under µ,
which is established by (32) in Lemma 2.
Next, we show that the process {(Xnt , Bt), t ∈ T } is a controlled Markov chain with respect
to the action process {Ant , t ∈ T } for agent n.
From the system dynamics and the belief evolution (22), we know that (Xnt+1, Bt+1) is a
function of {Xnt , Y −nt , Ant , A−nt , Bt,Wt} where Wt denotes all the noises at time t. Furthermore,
the distribution of (Y kt , A
k
t ) depends only on {Xkt , Bt,Wt, gkt } for any k 6= n. Therefore,
(Xnt+1, Bt+1) = f˜t(X
n
t , X
−n
t , A
n
t , Bt,Wt, g
−n
t ). (82)
Suppose agent n uses an arbitrary strategy g˜n. Then, for any realizations xnt+1 ∈ X nt+1, bt+1 =
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(ct+1, pit+1, pˆit+1) ∈ Bt+1, hnt = (xn1:t, hct) ∈ Hnt and ant ∈ Ant , we obtain
Pg˜n,g−nµ (xnt+1, bt+1|hnt , ant )
=
∑
x−nt ∈X−nt
Pg˜n,g−nµ (xnt+1, bt+1|x−nt , hnt , ant )Pg˜
n,g−n
µ (x
−n
t |hnt , ant )
=
∑
x−nt ∈X−nt
Pg˜n,g−nµ (xnt+1, bt+1|x−nt , hnt , ant )pit(x−nt )
=
∑
x−nt ∈X−nt
Pg
−n
t (xnt+1, bt+1|xnt , x−nt , bt, ant )pit(x−nt )
=Pg−nµ (xnt+1, bt+1|xnt , bt, ant ). (83)
The second equality in (83) follows from Lemma 3 and (32) in Lemma 2. The third equality in
(83) follows from (82). The last equality follows from the same arguments as the first through
third equalities.
Equation (83) shows that the process {(Xnt , Bt), t ∈ T } is a controlled Markov Chain with
respect to the action process {Ant , t ∈ T } for agent n. This process along with the instantaneous
utility (81) define a MDP. From the theory of MDP (see [30, Chap. 6]), there is an optimal
strategy of agent n that is of the form
λ′nt (x
n
t , bt) = λ
′n
t (x
n
t , (ct, γψ,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t))) (84)
for all hnt = (x
n
1:t, h
c
t) ∈ Hnt for all t ∈ T . This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose (λ∗, ψ∗) solves the dynamic program defined by (40)-(43).
Let V nt , n ∈ N , t ∈ T , denote the value functions computed by (40) and (43) from (λ∗, ψ∗).
Then ψ∗ is consistent with λ∗ from (42).
Let (g∗, µ∗) = f(λ∗, ψ∗) defined by Lemma 2. Then µ∗ is consistent with g∗ because of
Lemma 2. Furthermore, for all n ∈ N , t ∈ T , V nt (xnt , bt) (where bt = (ct, γψ∗,t(hct), γˆt(hct))) is
agent n’s expected continuation utility from time t on under µ∗ at hnt = (x
n
1:t, h
c
t) when agent n
uses g∗n and all other agents use g∗−n.
If every agent k 6= n uses the strategy g∗k, from Lemma 4 we know that there is a best
response g′n, under the belief system µ∗, of agent n such that for all t ∈ T
g′nt (h
n
t ) = λ
′n
t (x
n
t , bt) (85)
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for some CIB strategy λ′nt for all h
n
t = (h
c
t , x
n
1:t). Define a CIB strategy profile λ
′ := (λ′n, λ∗−n).
Let V ′nt , n ∈ N , t ∈ T , be the functions generated by (40) and (43) from (λ′, ψ∗). Then
V ′nt (x
n
t , bt) (where bt = (ct, γψ∗,t(h
c
t), γˆt(h
c
t))) is agent n’s expected continuation utility from
time t on under µ∗ at hnt = (x
n
1:t, h
c
t) when agent n uses g
′n and all other agents use g∗−n. Since
g′n is a best response, for all n ∈ N , t ∈ T and hnt = (xn1:t, hct) ∈ Hnt we must have
V ′nt (x
n
t , bt) ≥ V nt (xnt , bt). (86)
On the other hand, V ′nt (x
n
t , bt) is player n’s expected utility in stage game Gt(Vt+1, ψ
∗
t , bt)
when player n uses λ′n|bt , and other players use λ∗−n|bt . However, from (41), V nt (xnt , bt) is
player n’s maximum expected utility in stage game Gt(Vt+1, ψ∗t , bt) when other players use
λ∗−n|bt because the strategy λ∗nt |bt is a best response for player n in the stage game. This means
that for all n ∈ N , t ∈ T and bt ∈ Bt
V nt (x
n
t , bt) ≥ V ′nt (xnt , bt). (87)
Combining (86) and (86) we get
V nt (x
n
t , bt) = V
′n
t (x
n
t , bt). (88)
Equation (88) implies that, at any time t, the strategy g∗nt:T gives agent n the maximum expected
continuation utility from time t on under µ∗. This complete the proof that (g∗, µ∗) is a PBE. As
a result, the pair (λ∗, ψ∗) forms a CIB-PBE of the dynamic game described in Section II.
APPENDIX B
In order to prove Theorem 2, we first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5. In Game M
pˆint+1 = ψˆ
n
t (y
n
t , pˆit). (89)
Proof of Lemma 5: From Lemma 1
pˆint+1 =ψˆ
n
t (y
n
t , at, pˆit)(x
n
t+1)
=
∑
xnt ∈Xnt p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
n
t )∑
x′nt ∈Xnt q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
′n
t , at)pˆi
n
t (x
′n
t )
. (90)
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Since pnt (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at) = p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t ) and q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t , at) = q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t ) in Game M, the assertion
of the lemma holds.
Lemma 5 shows that in Game M the signaling-free beliefs do not depend on the actions.
We now prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2: Consider a CIB update rule ψ∗ given by
ψn∗t (y
n
t , at, bt) = ψˆ
n
t (y
n
t , pˆit). (91)
Based on ψ∗ defined by (91), we solve the dynamic program defined by (40)-(43) to get a CIB
strategy profile λ∗ and show that (λ∗, ψ∗) forms a CIB-PBE for Game M. Note that under the
update rule ψ∗ given by (91), we have for any n and t
Πnt = Πˆ
n
t (92)
Therefore, in the following we will replace Πnt by Πˆ
n
t and drop Π
n
t if both Π
n
t and Πˆ
n
t are
present.
The dynamic program for Game M can be solved by induction. We prove the following claim:
At any time t, there exists a CIB strategy λ∗t that satisfies (41), and the value functions
V nt , n ∈ N , generated by (40) and (43) from (λ∗t:T , ψ∗t:T ) satisfy
V nt (x
n
t , bt) = U˜
n
t (ct, pˆit) + V˜
n
t (x
n
t , ctk+1, pˆit) (93)
for some functions U˜nt (ct, pˆit) and V˜
n
t (x
n
t , ctk+1, pˆit) when tk + 1 ≤ t ≤ tk+1 for some tk ∈ T .
The above claim holds at t = T + 1 since V nT+1 = 0, n ∈ N .
Suppose the claim is true at t+ 1.
At time tk + 1 ≤ t < tk+1 for some tk ∈ T , Xnt+1 = Xnt , Yt = empty, and Ct+1 = (Ct, At) =
(Ctk+1, Atk+1:t). Then because of (55), (91) and the induction hypothesis for (93), player n’s
utility in stage game Gt(Vt+1, ψ∗t , bt) is equal to
UnGt(Vt+1,ψ∗t ,bt)
=φnt (ct, X
−n
t , At) + V
n
t+1(X
n
t+1, Ct+1, ψˆt(pˆit, Yt))
=φnt (ct, X
−n
t , At) + U˜
n
t+1((ct, At), ψˆt(pˆit))
+ V˜ nt+1(X
n
t , ctk+1, ψˆt(pˆit)) (94)
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for any bt ∈ Bt and n ∈ N . Define
φ˜nt (X
−n
t , At, bt)
:=φnt (ct, X
−n
t , At) + U˜
n
t+1((ct, At), ψˆt(pˆit)), (95)
V˜ nt (X
n
t , ctk+1, pˆit) := V˜
n
t+1(X
n
t , ctk+1, ψˆt(pˆit)). (96)
At t = tk for some tk ∈ T , Xntk+1 = fntk(Xntk ,W n,Xtk ), Y ntk = hntk(Xntk ,W n,Ytk ) and Ctk+1 =
f ctk(Ctk−1+1,W
C
tk
). Then because of (55), (91) and the induction hypothesis for (93), player n’s
utility in stage game Gtk(Vtk+1, ψ
∗
tk
, btk) is equal to
UnGtk (Vtk+1,ψ∗tk ,btk )
=φntk(ctk , X
−n
tk
, Atk) + V
n
tk+1
(Xntk+1, Ctk+1, ψˆt(pˆitk , Ytk))
=φntk(ctk , X
−n
tk
, Atk)
+U˜nt+1(f
c
tk
(ctk−1+1,W
C
tk
), ψˆt(pˆit, htk(Xtk ,W
Y
tk
)))
+V˜ nt+1(f
n
tk
(Xntk ,W
n,X
tk
), f ctk(ctk−1+1,W
C
tk
), ψˆt(pˆit)) (97)
for any bt ∈ Btk and n ∈ N . Define
φ˜ntk(ctk , X
−n
tk
, Atk , pˆitk) := φ
n
tk
(ctk , X
−n
tk
, Atk), (98)
V˜ ntk(X
n
tk
, ctk−1+1, pˆitk)
:=Epˆitk
[
U˜nt+1(f
c
tk
(ctk−1+1,W
C
tk
), ψˆt(pˆit, htk(Xtk ,W
Y
tk
)))
+ V˜ nt+1(f
n
tk
(Xntk ,W
n,X
tk
), f ctk(ctk−1+1,W
C
tk
), ψˆt(pˆitk))|Xtk
]
. (99)
Therefore, for any t, because of (94)-(99) player n’s expected utility conditional on (Xt, At)
in stage game Gt(Vt+1, ψ∗t , bt), for bt = (ct, pˆit) ∈ Bt, is equal to
Epˆit
[
UnGt(Vt+1,ψ∗t ,bt)|Xt, At
]
=φ˜nt (ct, X
−n
t , At, pˆit) + V˜
n
t (X
n
t , ctk+1, pˆit). (100)
when tk + 1 ≤ t ≤ tk+1 for tk ∈ T .
Since the second term in (100) does not depend on the players’ strategies, an equilibrium of
the stage game Gt(Vt+1, ψ∗t , bt) is also an equilibrium of the game G
′
t(Vt+1, ψ
∗
t , bt) where each
player n ∈ N has utility
UnG′t(Vt+1,ψ∗t ,bt) :=φ˜
n
t (ct, X
−n
t , At, pˆit). (101)
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For any bt ∈ Bt, since Ant is a finite set for any n ∈ N in Game M, the game G′t(Vt+1, ψ∗t , bt)
has at least one Bayesian Nash equilibrium λ˜∗t (bt) = {λ˜∗nt (bt) ∈ ∆(Ant ), n ∈ N} (see [1, 2]).
Define λ∗nt (x
n
t , bt) := λ˜
∗n
t (bt) for all x
n
t ∈ X nt , n ∈ N . Then, we get a CIB strategy λ∗t ∈
BNEt(Vt+1, ψ
∗
t ) so that (41) is satisfied at t. Moreover, from (43),
V nt (x
n
t , bt)
=Dnt (Vt+1, λ
∗
t , ψ
∗
t )(x
n
t , bt)
=Eλ
∗
t
pˆit
[
φ˜nt (ct, X
−n
t , At, pˆit) + V˜
n
t (X
n
t , ctk+1, pˆit)|xnt
]
(a)
=Eλ
∗
t
pˆit
[
φ˜nt (ct, X
−n
t , At, pˆit)
]
+ V˜ nt (x
n
t , ctk+1, pˆit)
=:U˜nt (ct, pˆit) + V˜
n
t (x
n
t , ctk+1, pˆit) (102)
where (a) is true because Ant only depends on bt using λ
∗n
t , and X
−n
t and Xnt are independent
under pˆit. Then (93) is satisfied at t, and the the proof of the claim is complete.
As a result of the claim, we obtain a CIB strategy profile λ∗ and a CIB update rule ψ∗ such
that (40), (41) and (43) are satisfied. It remains to show the consistency (42). Using the dynamics
of Game M and the fact that λ∗nt (xnt , bt) := λ˜∗nt (bt), we obtain∑
xnt ∈Xnt p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t , at)η
n
t (x
n
t , y
n
t , at, bt)pi
n
t (x
n
t )∑
x′nt ∈Xnt η
n
t (x
′n
t , y
n
t , at, bt)pi
n
t (x
′n
t )
=
∑
xnt ∈Xnt p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t )q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t )λ˜
∗n
t (bt)(a
n
t )pˆi
n
t (x
n
t )∑
x′nt ∈Xnt q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
′n
t )λ˜
∗n
t (bt)(a
n
t )pˆi
n
t (x
′n
t )
=
∑
xnt ∈Xnt p
n
t (x
n
t+1;x
n
t )q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
n
t )pˆi
n
t (x
n
t )∑
x′nt ∈Xnt q
n
t (y
n
t ;x
′n
t )pˆi
n
t (x
′n
t )
=ψˆnt (y
n
t , pˆit)(x
n
t ) = ψ
∗n
t (y
n
t , at, bt)(x
n
t ). (103)
Thus, ψ∗t satisfies (28), and ψ
∗
t is consistent with λ
∗
t . Therefore (42) holds.
Since (λ∗, ψ∗) solves the dynamic program defined by (40)-(43), it is a CIB-PBE according
to Theorem 1.
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